This arose from a video I watched of Curt Jaimungal’s where he takes Neil deGrasse Tyson to task for saying: “Don’t say I believe anything.” Curt then says (to the viewer, not Neil): “Your wincing is justified.” But we don’t know the context, and maybe Neil was saying that in response to a specific issue, where he was possibly being told what he ‘believed’. If that’s the case, it’s different to Curt’s inference that Neil doesn’t believe anything at all.
Having said that, there is another video where Curt criticises Neil's position concerning the role of philosophy, where Neil takes the position a lot of physicists do, that there is no role for philosophy in science, whereas I argue that theoretical physicists practice philosophy even if they don’t know it (Curt makes exactly the same point).
It’s a consequence of my go-to metaphor that there is an island of knowledge surrounded by a sea of ignorance, where science is the island and philosophy is the shoreline, and they interact and inform each other. As John Wheeler pointed out, as the island grows, so does the shoreline, therefore the interaction will never stop. This in itself is a philosophical position, consequently a belief.
However, I have an issue with Curt’s position, when he elaborates (in the first video) that we only have varying degrees of belief, implying there is nothing we can say that is true with complete certainty. I’ve taken issue with this before with people less qualified than Curt. I’m one of those who makes a distinction between things I know and things I believe, between facts and theory. I think this distinction is important, otherwise everything is up for grabs. And, in a way, this is already happening, when Donald Hoffman argues that there is no objective reality. For example, “There is no objective moon or spacetime that exists even when unperceived…”
It's obvious to me that scientists have beliefs, and I have no dispute with Curt over that particular point, which is what he spends the first few minutes of his video elaborating on, using philosophical quotes like, “Most contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a propositional attitude.” (Emphasis in the original.) Meaning, in effect, it can be updated later when one finds new evidence, as Curt explicitly points out. In other words, it’s conditional, which I expect all scientists agree is the case for all scientific theories. This is a logical consequence arising from there being no theory that can explain all phenomena – they all have limitations. Therefore, all scientists have beliefs about phenomena that a particular theory can’t explain.
But my point is that this doesn’t rule out facts and truths that an existing theory covers, based on empirical evidence. And this was Neil’s point in another video, where he claims that empirical evidence will always overrule philosophy, and I agree. In the same way that empirical evidence will overrule a scientific conjecture or hypothesis, which is basically the scientific method in a nutshell.
I wrote a comment on Curt’s post, where I referenced Bell’s Theorem, and how Alain Aspect demonstrated (by experiment) that it proved Einstein wrong about entanglement (refer my post discussing Brian Greene’s interview with him). Basically, I contend that Aspect demonstrated something that was true (quantum entanglement), therefore, I claim it’s no longer a belief, but something we know. But that has since led to other beliefs that physicists and philosophers of science argue over. For instance, Sabine Hossenfelder argues it’s evidence of superdeterminism, not non-locality (as Aspect would argue).
So I contend there is a dialectic between science and philosophy, between facts and theory. In the same comment, I argued there are mathematical truths like there being an infinite number of primes, which I contend transcends belief. Many argue that this is still a belief (including, possibly, Curt) but my response is that, where you have something that can be either true or false, and it’s demonstrated to be true, it becomes a fact and no longer a belief. Another example I give, is that the Earth goes around the Sun or it doesn’t – it’s either true or false – and if it’s true, it’s a fact, therefore something I claim to know.
Now, you might argue this is a belief, based on what others have told me, which is correct. But here’s the thing: look at the alternative, which is that the sun goes around the Earth, which was believed for millennia, and a classic case of a propositional belief being updated with new evidence. The new evidence is not just astronomical data but a deeper understanding of reality and the nature of gravity in particular. So it’s similar to the example I gave of Alain Aspect, where empirical evidence provides facts.
In the case of our theories on gravity (first Newton’s, then Einstein’s), they not only provide an explanation for the Earth’s orbit around the Sun, but a lot of other phenomena that were previously inexplicable or even unknown - black holes, anyone? Curt would argue that it’s still a belief, only with a very high degree of confidence. But if I go back to my metaphor: it’s become part of the island of knowledge, and I can’t see it being cut adrift back into the sea of ignorance.
My other point is that this knowledge, or fact, or truth, then becomes the basis for new beliefs, otherwise I can’t see how science can progress. Curt would argue that this in itself is a belief, because it’s a philosophical position (see below), and I can’t argue with that. So, even claiming there are truths in mathematics, for example, is a philosophical position, therefore a belief. Does this lead to a contradiction? I don’t think believing in truths axiomatically means there are no truths, which is an even greater contradiction.
After watching the video a second time, I wrote another comment on Curt’s post, where I attempt to address this point:
Towards the end, Curt provides a counter viewpoint that scientific theories are contingent, which most, if not all, scientists would agree. However, my point is that a scientific theory needs to contain some 'truths' otherwise it's useless. I don't believe there are no 'truths' in the world; just that they all have applicable limitations. I'm talking about 'truth' in an epistemological sense; something we know, even though it started out as a belief. I don't believe in epistemological relativism. Obviously, that's a philosophical position, so axiomatically, a belief.
But, leaving aside scientific beliefs and truths, and whether the latter even exist, there is another extreme viewpoint that Curt addresses, where he quotes Bas van Fraassen:
“I believe many things, I believe I had a father, that I wrote a book, that we are still in America, and not on a flying saucer… Could I be wrong? Are there circumstances under which I would correctly give up some of these beliefs? Certainly.”
(I could make exactly the same assertions, except I live in Australia.)
And the ‘circumstances’ are, when I am dreaming, but to question one’s reality to that extent (when awake), I would argue, lies on the road to madness. We would normally expect, if someone genuinely questioned these ‘facts’, they would need psychiatric help. In other words, taking extreme examples of where truth could be questioned opens a Pandora’s box, usually known as insanity.
But what if the whole pack of cards comes crashing down, and we learn that we live in a simulation? As more than a few people claim, therefore believe. I don’t see how that changes the reality I deal with every day, which can literally be a matter of life and death. That’s my litmus test for reality – it can kill me.
And this brings me back to Donald Hoffman, who doesn’t believe we live in a simulation, but nevertheless believes everything we see and interact with is a fabrication of the mind. He even argues that the 3 dimensional space we ‘perceive’ is in fact, 2 dimensional, despite all the evidence to the contrary, and despite the fact that it would be impossible for one to live in a 2D world in the same way that one can live in a 3D world – we would fall apart, for a start.
I wish to give an example of something I ‘know,’ which is utterly trivial, yet transcends belief. I know that I can’t breathe without air. But here’s the thing: air exists in space and time, whether perceived or not. I don’t ‘believe’ it ceases to exist when I stop interacting with it, or when I take off my ‘headset of my own making’ (to cite Hoffman). Does that mean, if I could ‘take my headset off’, I’d stop breathing? Even when we are dreaming, experiencing a simulacrum of ‘our own making’, we continue to breath, because the external reality continues to exist, even while unperceived.