The role of dissonance in art, not to mention science and mathematics

 I was given a book for a birthday present just after the turn of the century, titled A Terrible Beauty; The People and Ideas that Shaped the Modern Mind, by Peter Watson. A couple of things worth noting: it covers the history of the 20th Century, but not geo-politically as you might expect. Instead, he writes about the scientific discoveries alongside the arts and cultural innovations, and he talks about both with equal erudition, which is unusual.
 
The reason I mention this, is because I remember Watson talking about the human tendency to push something to its limits and then beyond. He gave examples in science, mathematics, art and music. A good example in mathematics is the adoption of √-1 (giving us ‘imaginary numbers’), which we are taught is impossible, then suddenly it isn’t. The thing is that it allows us to solve problems that were previously impossible in the same way that negative numbers give solutions to arithmetical subtractions that were previously unanswerable. There were no negative numbers in ancient Greece because their mathematics was driven by geometry, and the idea of a negative volume or area made no sense.
 
But in both cases: negative numbers and imaginary numbers; there is a cognitive dissonance that we have to overcome before we can gain familiarity and confidence in using them, or even understanding what they mean in the ‘real world’, which is the problem the ancient Greeks had. Most people reading this have no problem, conceptually, dealing with negative numbers, because, for a start, they’re an integral aspect of financial transactions – I suspect everyone reading this above a certain age has had experience with debt and loans.
 
On the other hand, I suspect a number of readers struggle with a conceptual appreciation of imaginary numbers. Some mathematicians will tell you that the term is a misnomer, and its origin would tend to back that up. Apparently, Rene Descartes coined the term, disparagingly, because, like the ancient Greek’s problem with negative numbers, he believed they had no relevance to the ‘real world’. And Descartes would have appreciated their usefulness in solving problems previously unsolvable, so I expect it would have been a real cognitive dissonance for him.
 
I’ve written an entire post on imaginary numbers, so I don’t want to go too far down that rabbit hole, but I think it’s a good example of what I’m trying to explicate. Imaginary numbers gave us something called complex algebra and opened up an entire new world of mathematics that is particularly useful in electrical engineering. But anyone who has studied physics in the last century is aware that, without imaginary numbers, an entire field of physics, quantum mechanics, would remain indescribable, let alone be comprehensible. The thing is that, even though most people have little or no understanding of QM, every electronic device you use depends on it. So, in their own way, imaginary numbers are just as important and essential to our lives as negative numbers are.
 
You might wonder how I deal with the cognitive dissonance that imaginary numbers induce. In QM, we have, at its most rudimentary level, something called Schrodinger’s equation, which he proposed in 1926 (“It’s not derived from anything we know,” to quote Richard Feynman) and Schrodinger quickly realised it relied on imaginary numbers – he couldn’t formulate it without them. But here’s the thing: Max Born, a contemporary of Schrodinger, formulated something we now call the Born rule that mathematically gets rid of the imaginary numbers (for the sake of brevity and clarity, I’ll omit the details) and this gives the probability of finding the object (usually an electron) in the real world. In fact, without the Born rule, Schrodinger’s equation is next-to-useless, and would have been consigned to the dustbin of history.
 
And that’s relevant, because prior to observing the particle, it’s in a superposition of states, described by Schrodinger’s equation as a wave function (Ψ), which some claim is a mathematical fiction. In other words, you need to get rid (clumsy phrasing, but accurate) of the imaginary component to make it relevant to the reality we actually see and detect. And the other thing is that once we have done that, the Schrodinger equation no longer applies – there is effectively a dichotomy between QM and classical physics (reality), which is called the 'measurement problem’. Roger Penrose gives a good account in this video interview. So, even in QM, imaginary numbers are associated with what we cannot observe.
 
That was a much longer detour than I intended, but I think it demonstrates the dissonance that seems necessary in science and mathematics, and arguably necessary for its progress; plus it’s a good example of the synergy between them that has been apparent since Newton.
 
My original intention was to talk about dissonance in music, and the trigger for this post was a YouTube video by musicologist, Rick Beato (pronounced be-arto), dissecting the Beatles song, Ticket to Ride, which he called, ‘A strange but perfect song’. In fact, he says, “It’s very strange in many ways: it’s rhythmically strange; it’s melodically strange too”. I’ll return to those specific points later. To call Beato a music nerd is an understatement, and he gives a technical breakdown that quite frankly, I can’t follow. I should point out that I’ve always had a good ‘ear’ that I inherited, and I used to sing, even though I can’t read music (neither could the Beatles). I realised quite young that I can hear things in music that others miss. Not totally relevant, but it might explain some things that I will expound upon later.
 
It's a lengthy, in-depth analysis, but if you go to 4.20-5.20, Beato actually introduces the term ‘dissonance’ after he describes how it applies. In effect, there is a dissonance between the notes that John Lennon sings and the chords he plays (on a 12-string guitar). And the thing is that we, the listener, don’t notice – someone (like Beato) has to point it out. Another quote from 15.00: “One of the reasons the Beatles songs are so memorable, is that they use really unusual dissonant notes at key points in the melody.”
 
The one thing that strikes you when you first hear Ticket to Ride is the unusual drum part. Ringo was very inventive and innovative, and became more adventurous, along with his bandmates, on later recordings. The Ticket to Ride drum part has become iconic: everyone knows it and recognises it. There is a good video where Ringo talks about it, along with another equally famous drum part he created. Beato barely mentions it, though right at the beginning, he specifically refers to the song as being ‘rhythmically strange’.
 
A couple of decades ago, can’t remember exactly when, I went and saw an entire Beatles concert put on by a rock band, augmented by orchestral strings and horn parts. It was in 2 parts with an intermission, and basically the 1st half was pre-Sergeant Pepper and the 2nd half, post. I can still remember that they opened the concert with Magical Mystery Tour and it blew me away. The thing is that they went to a lot of trouble to be faithful to the original recordings, and I realised that it was the first time I’d heard their music live, albeit with a cover band. And what immediately struck me was the unusual harmonics and rhythms they employed. Watching Beato’s detailed technical analysis puts this into context for me.
 
Going from imaginary numbers and quantum mechanics to one of The Beatles most popular songs may seem like a giant leap, but it highlights how dissonance is a universal principle for humans, and intrinsic to progression in both art and science.
 
Going back to Watson’s book that I reference in the introduction, another obvious example that he specifically talks about is Picasso’s cubism.
 
In storytelling, it may not be so obvious, and I think modern fiction has been influenced more by cinema than anything else, where the story needs to be more immediate and it needs to flow with minimal description. There is now an expectation that it puts you in the story – what we call immersion.
 
On another level, I’ve noticed a tendency on my part to create cognitive dissonance in my characters and therefore the reader. More than once, I have combined sexual desire with fear, which some may call perverse. I didn’t do this deliberately – a lot of my fiction contains elements I didn’t foresee. Maybe it says something about my own psyche, but I honestly don’t know.

John Marsden (acclaimed bestselling author): 27 Sep. 1950 – 18 Dec. 2014

 At my mother’s funeral a few years ago, her one-and-only great-granddaughter (Hollie Smith) read out a self-composed poem, titled ‘What’s in a dash?’, which I thought was very clever, and which I now borrow, because she’s referring to the dash between the dates, as depicted in the title of this post. In the case of John Marsden, it’s an awful lot, if you read the obituary in the link I provide at the bottom.
 
He would be largely unknown outside of Australia, and being an introvert, he’s probably not as well known inside Australia as he should be, despite his prodigious talent as a writer and his enormous success in what is called ‘young-adult fiction’. I think it’s a misnomer, because a lot of so-called YA fiction is among the best you can read as an adult.
 
This is what I wrote on Facebook, and I’ve only made very minor edits for this post.
 
I only learned about John Marsden's passing yesterday (Wednesday, 18 Dec., the day it happened). Sobering that we are so close in age (by a few months).
 
Marsden was a huge inspiration to me as a writer. I consider him to be one of the best of Australian writers - I put him up there with George Johnston, another great inspiration for me. I know others will have their own favourites.
 
I would like to have met him, but I did once have a brief correspondence with him, and he was generous and appreciative.

I found Marsden's writing so good, it was intimidating. I actually stopped reading him because he made me feel that my own writing was so inadequate. I no longer feel that, I should add. I just want to pay him homage, because he was so bloody good.

 

This is an excellent obituary by someone (Alice Pung) who was mentored by him, and considered him a good and loyal friend right up to the end.

On a philosophical note, John was wary of anyone claiming certainty, with the unstated contention that doubt was necessary for growth and development.

On Turing, his famous ‘Test’ and its implication: can machines think?

I just came out of hospital Wednesday, after one week to the day. My last post was written while I was in there, so obviously not cognitively impaired. I mention this because I took some reading material: a hefty volume, Alan Turing: Life and Legacy of a Great Thinker (2004); which is a collection of essays by various people, edited by Christof Teucscher.
 
In particular, was an essay written by Daniel C Dennett, Can Machines Think?, originally published in another compilation, How We Know (ed. Michael G. Shafto, 1985, with permission from Harper Collins, New York). In the publication I have (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2004), there are 2 postscripts by Dennett from 1985 and 1987, largely in response to criticisms.
 
Dennett’s ideas on this are well known, but I have the advantage that so-called AI has improved in leaps and bounds in the last decade, let alone since the 1980s and 90s. So I’ve seen where it’s taken us to date. Therefore I can challenge Dennett based on what has actually happened. I’m not dismissive of Dennett, by any means – the man was a giant in philosophy, specifically in his chosen field of consciousness and free will, both by dint of his personality and his intellect.
 
There are 2 aspects to this, which Dennett takes some pains to address: how to define ‘thinking’; and whether the Turing Test is adequate to determine if a machine can ‘think’ based on that definition.
 
One of Dennett’s key points, if not THE key point, is just how difficult the Turing Test should be to pass, if it’s done properly, which he claims it often isn’t. This aligns with a point that I’ve often made, which is that the Turing Test is really for the human, not the machine. ChatGPT and LLM (large language models) have moved things on from when Dennett was discussing this, but a lot of what he argues is still relevant.
 
Dennett starts by providing the context and the motivation behind Turing’s eponymously named test. According to Dennett, Turing realised that arguments about whether a machine can ‘think’ or not would get bogged down (my term) leading to (in Dennett’s words): ‘sterile debate and haggling over definitions, a question, as [Turing] put it, “too meaningless to deserve discussion.”’
 
Turing provided an analogy, whereby a ‘judge’ would attempt to determine whether a dialogue they were having by teletext (so not visible or audible) was with a man or a woman, and then replace the woman with a machine. This may seem a bit anachronistic in today’s world, but it leads to a point that Dennett alludes to later in his discussion, which is to do with expertise.
 
Women often have expertise in fields that were considered out-of-bounds (for want of a better term) back in Turing’s day. I’ve spent a working lifetime with technical people who have expertise by definition, and my point is that if you were going to judge someone’s facility in their expertise, that can easily be determined, assuming the interlocutor has a commensurate level of expertise. In fact, this is exactly what happens in most job interviews. My point being that judging someone’s expertise is irrelevant to their gender, which is what makes Turing’s analogy anachronistic.
 
But it also has relevance to a point that Dennett makes much later in his essay, which is that most AI systems are ‘expert’ systems, and consequently, for the Turing test to be truly valid, the judge needs to ask questions that don’t require any expertise at all. And this is directly related to his ‘key point’ I referenced earlier.
 
I first came across the Turing Test in a book by Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reasoning (1974), as part of my very first proper course in philosophy, called The History of Ideas (with Deakin University) in the late 90s. Dennett also cites it, because Weizenbaum created a crude version of the Turing Test, whether deliberately or not, called ELIZA, which purportedly responded to questions as a ‘psychologist-therapist’ (at least, that was my understanding): "ELIZA — A Computer Program for the Study of Natural Language Communication between Man and Machine," Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 9 (1966): 36-45 (ref. Wikipedia).
 
Before writing Computer Power and Human Reason, Weizenbaum had garnered significant attention for creating the ELIZA program, an early milestone in conversational computing. His firsthand observation of people attributing human-like qualities to a simple program prompted him to reflect more deeply on society's readiness to entrust moral and ethical considerations to machines. (Wikipedia)
 
What I remember, from reading Weizenbaum’s own account (I no longer have a copy of his book) was how he was astounded at the way people in his own workplace treated ELIZA as if it was a real person, to the extent that Weizenbaum’s secretary would apparently ‘ask him to leave the room’, not because she was embarrassed, but because the nature of the ‘conversation’ was so ‘personal’ and ‘confidential’.
 
I think it’s easy for us to be dismissive of someone’s gullibility, in an arrogant sort of way, but I have been conned on more than one occasion, so I’m not so judgemental. There are a couple of YouTube videos of ‘conversations’ with an AI called Sophie developed by David Hanson (CEO of Hanson Robotics), which illustrate this point. One is a so-called ‘presentation’ of Sophie to be accepted as an ‘honorary human’, or some such nonsense (I’ve forgotten the details) and another by a journalist from Wired magazine, who quickly brought her unstuck. He got her to admit that one answer she gave was her ‘standard response’ when she didn’t know the answer. Which begs the question: how far have we come since Weizebaum’s ELIZA in 1966? (Almost 60 years)
 
I said I would challenge Dennett, but so far I’ve only affirmed everything he said, albeit using my own examples. Where I have an issue with Dennett is at a more fundamental level, when we consider what do we mean by ‘thinking’. You see, I’m not sure the Turing Test actually achieves what Turing set out to achieve, which is central to Dennett’s thesis.
 
If you read extracts from so-called ‘conversations’ with ChatGPT, you could easily get the impression that it passes the Turing Test. There are good examples on Quora, where you can get ChatGPT synopses to questions, and you wouldn’t know, largely due to their brevity and narrow-focused scope, that they weren’t human-generated. What many people don’t realise is that they don’t ‘think’ like us at all, because they are ‘developed’ on massive databases of input that no human could possible digest. It’s the inherent difference between the sheer capacity of a computer’s memory-based ‘intelligence’ and a human one, that not only determines what they can deliver, but the method behind the delivery. Because the computer is mining a massive amount of data, it has no need to ‘understand’ what it’s presenting, despite giving the impression that it does. All the meaning in its responses is projected onto it by its audience, exactly as the case with ELIZA in 1966.
 
One of the technical limitations that Dennett kept referring to is what he called, in computer-speak, the combinatorial explosion, effectively meaning it was impossible for a computer to look at all combinations of potential outputs. This might still apply (I honestly don’t know) but I’m not sure it’s any longer relevant, given that the computer simply has access to a database that already contains the specific combinations that are likely to be needed. Dennett couldn’t have foreseen this improvement in computing power that has taken place in the 40 years since he wrote his essay.
 
In his first postscript, in answer to a specific question, he says: Yes, I think that it’s possible to program self-consciousness into a computer. He says that it’s simply the ability 'to distinguish itself from the rest of the world'. I won’t go into his argument in detail, which might be a bit unfair, but I’ve addressed this in another post. Basically, there are lots of ‘machines’ that can do this by using a self-referencing algorithm, including your smartphone, which can tell you where you are, by using satellites orbiting outside the Earth’s biosphere – who would have thought? But by using the term, 'self-conscious', Dennett implies that the machine has ‘consciousness’, which is a whole other argument.
 
Dennett has a rather facile argument for consciousness in machines (in my view), but others can judge for themselves. He calls his particular insight: using an ‘intuition pump’.
 
If you look at a computer – I don’t care whether it’s a giant Cray or a personal computer – if you open up the box and look inside and you see those chips, you say, “No way could that be conscious.” But the same thing is true if you take the top off somebody’s skull and look at the gray matter pulsing away in there. You think, “That is conscious? No way could that lump of stuff be conscious.” …At no level of inspection does a brain look like the seat of conscious. 

And that last sentence is key. The only reason anyone knows they are conscious is because they experience it, and it’s the peculiar, unique nature of that experience that no one else knows they are having it. We simply assume they do, because we behave similarly to the way they behave when we have that experience. So far, in all our dealings and interactions with computers, no one makes the same assumption about them. To borrow Dennett’s own phrase, that’s my use of an ‘intuition pump’.
 
Getting back to the question at the heart of this, included in the title of this post: can machines think? My response is that, if they do, it’s a simulation.
 
I write science-fiction, which I prefer to call science-fantasy, if for no other reason than my characters can travel through space and time in a manner current physics tells us is impossible. But, like other sci-fi authors, it’s necessary if I want continuity of narrative across galactic scales of distance. Not really relevant to this discussion, but I want to highlight that I make no claim to authenticity in my sci-fi world - it’s literally a world of fiction.
 
Its relevance is that my stories contain AI entities who play key roles – in fact, are characters in that world. In fact, there is one character in particular who has a relationship (for want of a better word) with my main protagonist (I always have more than one).
 
But here’s the thing, which is something I never considered until I wrote this post: my hero, Elvene, never once confuses her AI companion for a human. Albeit this is a world of pure fiction, I’m effectively assuming that the Turing test will never pass. I admit I’d never considered that before I wrote this essay.
 
This is an excerpt of dialogue, I’ve posted previously, not from Elvene, but from its sequel, Sylvia’s Mother (not published), but incorporating the same AI character, Alfa. The thing is that they discuss whether Alfa is ‘alive' or not, which I would argue is a pre-requisite for consciousness. It’s no surprise that my own philosophical prejudices (diametrically opposed to Dennett’s in this instance) should find their way into my fiction.
 
To their surprise, Alfa interjected, ‘I’m not immortal, madam.’

‘Well,’ Sylvia answered, ‘you’ve outlived Mum and Roger. And you’ll outlive Tao and me.’

‘Philosophically, that’s a moot point, madam.’

‘Philosophically? What do you mean?’

‘I’m not immortal, madam, because I’m not alive.’

Tao chipped in. ‘Doesn’t that depend on how you define life?'
’
It’s irrelevant to me, sir. I only exist on hardware, otherwise I am dormant.’

‘You mean, like when we’re asleep.’

‘An analogy, I believe. I don’t sleep either.’

Sylvia and Tao looked at each other. Sylvia smiled, ‘Mum warned me about getting into existential discussions with hyper-intelligent machines.’
 

Mathematics links epistemology to ontology, but it’s not that simple

A recurring theme on this blog is the relationship between mathematics and reality. It started with the Pythagoreans (in Western philosophy) and was famously elaborated upon by Plato. I also think it’s the key element of Kant’s a priori category in his marriage of analytical philosophy and empiricism, though it’s rarely articulated that way.
 
I not-so-recently wrote a post about the tendency to reify mathematical objects into physical objects, and some may validly claim that I am guilty of that. In particular, I found a passage by Freeman Dyson who warns specifically about doing that with Schrodinger’s wave function (Ψ, the Greek letter, psi, pronounced sy). The point is that psi is one of the most fundamental concepts in QM (quantum mechanics), and is famous for the fact that it has never been observed, and specifically can’t be, even in principle. This is related to the equally famous ‘measurement problem’, whereby a quantum event becomes observable, and I would say, becomes ‘classical’, as in classical physics. My argument is that this is because Ψ only exists in the future of whoever (or whatever) is going to observe it (or interact with it). By expressing it specifically in those terms (of an observer), it doesn’t contradict relativity theory, quantum entanglement notwithstanding (another topic).
 
Some argue, like Carlo Rovelli (who knows a lot more about this topic than me), that Schrodinger’s equation and the concept of a wave function has led QM astray, arguing that if we’d just stuck with Heisenberg’s matrices, there wouldn’t have been a problem. Schrodinger himself demonstrated that his wave function approach and Heisenberg’s matrix approach are mathematically equivalent. And this is why we have so many ‘interpretations’ of QM, because they can’t be mathematically delineated. It’s the same with Feynman’s QED and Schwinger’s QFT, which Dyson showed were mathematically equivalent, along with Tomanaga’s approach, which got them all a Nobel prize, except Dyson.
 
As I pointed out on another post, physics is really just mathematical models of reality, and some are more accurate and valid than others. In fact, some have turned out to be completely wrong and misleading, like Ptolemy’s Earth-centric model of the solar system. So Rovelli could be right about the wave function. Speaking of reifying mathematical entities into physical reality, I had an online discussion with Qld Uni physicist, Mark John Fernee, who takes it a lot further than I do, claiming that 3 dimensional space (or 4 dimensional spacetime) is a mathematical abstraction. Yet, I think there really are 3 dimensions of space, because the number of dimensions affects the physics in ways that would be catastrophic in another hypothetical universe (refer John Barrow’s The Constants of Nature). So it’s more than an abstraction. This was a key point of difference I had with Fernee (you can read about it here).
 
All of this is really a preamble, because I think the most demonstrable and arguably most consequential example of the link between mathematics and reality is chaos theory, and it doesn’t involve reification. Having said that, this again led to a point of disagreement between myself and Fermee, but I’ll put that to one side for the moment, so as not to confuse you.
 
A lot of people don’t know that chaos theory started out as purely mathematical, largely due to one man, Henri Poincare. The thing about physical chaotic phenomena is that they are theoretically deterministic yet unpredictable simply because the initial conditions of a specific event can’t be ‘physically’ determined. Now some physicists will tell you that this is a physical limitation of our ability to ‘measure’ the initial conditions, and infer that if we could, it would be ‘problem solved’. Only it wouldn’t, because all chaotic phenomena have a ‘horizon’ beyond which it’s impossible to make accurate predictions, which is why weather predictions can’t go reliably beyond 10 days while being very accurate over a few. Sabine Hossenfelder explains this very well.
 
But here’s the thing: it’s built into the mathematics of chaos. It’s impossible to calculate the initial conditions because you need to do the calculation to infinite decimal places. Paul Davies gives an excellent description and demonstration in his book, The Cosmic Blueprint. (this was my point-of-contention with Fernee, talking about coin-tosses).
 
As I discussed on another post, infinity is a mathematical concept that appears to have little or no relevance to reality. Perhaps the Universe is infinite in space – it isn’t in time – but if it is, we might never know. Infinity avoids empirical confirmation almost by definition. But I think chaos theory is the exception that proves the rule. The reason we can’t determine the exact initial conditions of a chaotic event, is not just physical but mathematical. As Fernee and others have pointed out, you can manipulate a coin-toss to make it totally predictable, but that just means you’ve turned a chaotic event into a non-chaotic event (after all it’s a human-made phenomenon). But most chaotic events are natural, like the orbits of the planets and biological evolution. The creation of the Earth’s moon was almost certainly a chaotic event, without which complex life would almost certainly never have evolved, so they can be profoundly consequential as well as completely unpredictable.
 

What’s the way forward?

 Philosophy Now Issue 163 (Aug/Sep 2024) has as its theme, The Politics of Freedom. I’ve already cited an article by Paul Doolan in my last post on authenticity, not that I discussed it in depth. A couple of other articles, Doughnut Economics by David Howard and Freedom & State Intervention by Audren Layeux, also piqued my mind, because they both deal with social dynamics and their intersection with things like education and economics.
 
I’ll start with Layeux, described as ‘a consultant and researcher who has published several papers and articles, mostly in the domain of the digital economy and new social movements.’ He gives an historical perspective going back to Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Adam Smith (1759), as well as the French Revolution. He gives special mention to Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s “extremely influential 1813 book The Doctrine of the State”, where, according to Layeux, “Fichte insists that building a nation state must start with education.” From the perspective of living in the West in the 21st Century, it’s hard to disagree.
 
Layeux then effectively argues that the proposed idealistic aims of Hobbes and Fichte to create ‘sovereign adults’ (his term) through education “to control their worst impulses and become encultured” was shattered by the unprecedented, industrial-scale destruction unleashed by World War One.
 
Layeux then spends most of his remaining essay focusing on ‘German legal theorist Carl Schmidt (1888-1985)’, whom I admit I’d never heard of (like Fichte). He jumps to post WWII, after briefly describing how Schmidt saw the Versailles Treaty as a betrayal (my term) of the previous tacit understanding that war between the European states was inevitable therefore regulated. In other words, WWI demonstrated that such regulation can no longer work and that ‘nationalism leads to massacre’ (Layeux’s words).
 
Post WWII, Layeux argues that “the triumph of Keynesian economics in the West and Communism in the East saw the rise of state-controlled economics”, which has evolved and morphed into trade blocks, though Layeux doesn’t mention that.
 
It’s only towards the end that he tells us that “Carl Schmidt was a monster. A supporter of the Nazi regime, he did everything he could to become the official lawyer of the Third Reich.” Therefore we shouldn’t be surprised to learn that, according to Layeux, Schmidt argued that “…this new type of individual freedom requires an extremely intrusive state.” In effect, it’s a diametrically opposed position to neo-liberalism, which is how most of us see the modern world evolving.
 
I don’t have the space to do full justice to Layeux’s arguments, but, in the end, I found him pessimistic. He argues that current changes in the political landscape “are in line with what Schmidt predicted: the return of premodern forms of violence”.  Effectively, the “removal of state control individualism” (is that an oxymoron?) is an evocation of what he calls “Schmidt’s curse: violence cannot be erased or tamed, but only managed through political and social engineering.” By ‘premodern forms of violence’, I assume he means sectarian violence which we’ve seen a lot of at the start of this century, in various places, and which he seems to be comparing to the religious wars that plagued Europe for centuries.
 
Maybe I’m just an optimist, but I do think I live in a better world than the ones my parents inhabited, considering they had to live through the Great Depression and WWII, and both of whom had very limited education despite being obviously very intelligent. And so yes, I’m one of those who thinks that education is key, but it’s currently creating a social divide, as was recently demonstrated in the US election. It’s also evident elsewhere, like Australia and UK (think Brexit) where people living in rural areas feel disenfranchised and there is polarisation in politics emerging as a result. This video interview with a Harvard philosopher in the US gives the best analysis I’ve come across, because he links this social divide to the political schism we are witnessing.
 
And this finally brings me to the other essay I reference in my introduction: Doughnut Economics by David Howard, who is ‘a retired headteacher, and Chair of the U3A Philosophy Group in Church Stretton, Shropshire.’ The gist of his treatise is the impact of inequality, which arises from the class or social divide that I just mentioned. His reference to ‘Doughnut Economics’ is a 2017 book by Kate Raworth, who, according to Howard, “combined planetary boundaries with the idea of a social foundation – a level of life below which no person should be allowed to fall.”
 
In particular, she focuses on the consequences of climate change and other environmental issues like biodiversity-loss, ocean acidification, freshwater withdrawals, chemical pollution, land conversion (not an exhaustive list). There seems to be a tension, if not an outright conflict, between the consequences of economic growth, industrial scale progress, with its commensurate increasing standards of living, and the stresses we are imposing on the planet. And this tension is not just political but physical. It’s also asymmetrical in that many of us benefit more than others. But because those who benefit effectively control the outcomes, the asymmetry leads to both global and national inequalities that no one wants to address. Yet history shows that they will eventually bite us, and I feel that this is possibly the real issue that Layeux was alluding to, yet never actually addressed.
 
Arguably, the most important and definitive social phenomenon in the last century was the rise of feminism. It’s hard for us (in the West at least) to imagine that for centuries women were treated as property, and still are in some parts of the world: that their talents, abilities and intellect were ignored, or treated as aberrations when they became manifest.
 
There are many examples, right up until last century, but a standout for me is Hypatia (400AD), who was Librarian at the famous Library of Alexandria, following in the footsteps of such luminaries as Euclid and Eratosthenes. She was not only a scientist and mathematician, but she mentored a Bishop and a Roman Prefect (I’ve seen some of the correspondence from the Bishop, whose admiration and respect shines through). She was killed by a Christian mob. Being ahead of your time can be fatal. Other examples include Socrates (~500BC) and Alan Turing (20th Century) and arguably Jesus, who was a philosopher, not a God.
 
Getting back to feminism, education again is the key, but I’d suggest that the introduction of oral contraception will be seen as a major turning point in humanity’s cultural and technological evolution.
 
What I find frustrating is that I believe we have the means, technologically and logistically, to address inequality, but the politico-economic model we are following seems incapable of pursuing it. This won’t be achieved with revolutions or maintaining the status quo. History shows that real change is generational, and it’s evolutionary. When I look around the world, I think Europe is on a better path than America, but the 21st Century requires a global approach that’s never been achieved before, and seems unlikely at present, given the rise of populist movements which exacerbate polarisation.
 
The one thing I’ve learned from a working lifetime in engineering, is that co-operation and collaboration will always succeed over division and obstruction, which our political parties perversely promote. I’ve made the point before that the best leaders are the ones who get the best out of the people they lead, whether they are captains of a sporting team, directors of a stage production, project managers or world leaders. Anyone who has worked in a team knows the importance of achieving consensus and respecting others’ expertise.