Monty Hall Paradox explained

This is a well known problem based on a 1960s US television game show called Let’s Make a Deal. How closely it resembles that particular show, I don’t know, but it’s not relevant, because it’s easy to imagine. The show’s host’s stage-name was Monty Hall, hence the name of the puzzle.

 

In 1975, an American statistician and professor at the University of California, Berkeley, Steve Selvin, published a short article on the Monty Hall Paradox in The American Statistician, which he saw as a curiosity for a very select group who would appreciate its quirkiness and counter-intuitive answer. He received some criticism, which he easily countered.

 

Another totally unrelated (weekly) periodical, Parade magazine, with a circulation in the tens of millions, had a column called Ask Marilyn, who specialised in solving mathematical puzzles, brain teasers and logical conundrums sent to her by readers. She was Marilyn vos Savant, and entered the Guinness Book of Records in the 1980s as the woman with the highest recorded IQ (185). I obtained all this information from Jim Al-Khalili’s book, Paradox; The Nine Greatest Enigmas in Physics.

 

Someone sent Marilyn the Monty Hall puzzle and she came up with the same counter-intuitive answer as Selvin, but she created an uproar and was ridiculed by mathematicians and academics across the country. Al-Khalili publishes a sample of the responses, at least one of which borders on misogynistic. Notwithstanding, she gave a more comprehensive exposition in a later issue of Parade, emphasising a couple of points I’ll come to later.

 

Now, when I first came across this puzzle, I, like many others, couldn’t understand how she could possibly be right. Let me explain.

 

Imagine a game show where there is just a contestant and the host, and there are 3 doors. Behind one of the doors is the key to a brand-new car, and behind the other 2 doors are goats (pictures of goats). The host asks the contestant to select a door. After they’ve made their selection, the host opens one of the other 2 doors revealing a goat. Then he makes an offer to the contestant, saying they can change their mind and choose the other door if they wish. In the original scenario, the host offers the contestant money to change their mind, upping the stakes.

 

Now, if you were a contestant, you might think the host is trying to trick you out of winning the car (assuming the host knows where the car is). But, since you don’t know where the car is, you now have a 1 in 2 chance of winning the car, whereas before you had a 1 in 3 chance. So changing doors won’t make any difference to your odds.

 

But both Selvin and vos Savant argued that if you change doors you double your chances. How can that be?

 

I found a solution on the internet by the Institute of Mathematics, giving a detail history and a solution using Bayes’ Theorem, which is difficult to follow if you’re not familiar with it. The post also provides an exposition listing 5 assumptions. In common with Al-Khalili, the author (Clive Rix from the University of Leicester), shows how the problem is similar to one posed by Martin Gardner, who had a regular column in Scientific American, involving 3 prisoners, one of whom would be pardoned. I won’t go into it, but you can look it up, if you’re interested, by following the link I provided.

 

What’s important is that there are 2 assumptions that change everything. And I didn’t appreciate this until I read Al-Khalili’s account. Nevertheless, I found it necessary to come up with my own solution.

 

The 2 key assumptions are that the host knows which door hides the car, and the host never picks the car.

 

So I will describe 3 scenarios:

 

1)    The assumptions don’t apply.

2)    We apply assumption No1.

3)    We apply assumptions 1 & 2.

 

In all 3 scenarios, the contestant chooses first.

 

In scenario 1: the contestant has a 1 in 3 chance of selecting the car. If the contest is run a number of times (say, 100 or so), the contestant will choose the car 1/3 of the times, and the host will choose the car 1/3 of the time, and 1/3 of the time it’s not chosen by either of them.

 

Scenario 2: the host knows where the car is, but he lets the contestant choose first. In 1/3 of cases the contestant chooses the car, but now in 2/3 of cases, the host can choose the car.

 

Scenario 3: the host knows where the car is and never chooses the car. Again, the contestant chooses first and has a 1 in 3 chance of winning. But the host knows where the car is, and in 1/3 of cases it's like scenario 1. However, in 2/3 of cases he chooses the door which doesn’t have the car, so the car must be behind the other door. Therefore, if the contestant changes doors they double their chances from 1 in 3 to 2 in 3.

Will the 21st Century be a turning point in human history?

 The short answer, I believe, is Yes, but whether it will be positive or negative is up for conjecture. If history is any guide, I’d have to say things don’t look particularly promising. There have been a number of things I’ve read recently, and viewed on TV, from various sources that have made me reflect on this, and it’s hard to know where to start. 

Maybe I’ll start with something I wrote on Facebook recently, which was the seed for this rumination.

 

Humanity has always had both the capacity and inclination for self-destruction. It is our Achilles heel. One can't help but think that the 21st Century is our turning point, one way or the other.

 

There are lots of examples, the Roman Empire being one of the most cited, but also the ancient Egyptians and the Mayans, not to mention Easter Island. Curiously, I’ve just started watching Foundation, on Apple TV, based on Isaac Asimov’s famous books, which is premised on the fall of a future galactic empire founded and run by humanity.

 

But there is another TV series by the BBC called Capital, very contemporary, which I’ve also just started watching, and seems to encapsulate our current situation. I’ve only watched one episode, which centres on a single street in England, but is rendered as a microcosm of global politics and social dilemmas. 

There is the corporate middle manager whose ambition and greed is only outdone by his wife, who mentally spends his money before he’s even earned it. There is the refugee from Zimbabwe who is working illegally, therefore exploited by an ‘agent’, while she faces imminent deportation even though she fears death on arrival. Something that refugees in Australia can readily identify with. There is the Pakistani corner shopkeeper, who is a diligent neighbour, with 2 sons, one who has become religiously conservative and the other who has started, but not completed, 3 university degrees (I can identify with that). He’s the target of a stalker, covertly photographing him and his family. Like everyone else in the street, he’s receiving postcards with the ominous warning, We Want What You Have. In other words, there is an undercurrent of class envy which could fester into something more sinister. Another of the recipients is an elderly woman, whose son and daughter have all but abandoned her, and who is facing terminal illness, but she’s inherited the sin of living in a capitally inflated home.

 

Also, on TV recently, I watched a programme on (Australia’s) ABC 4 Corners, called The Pandora Papers, which is about tax havens for the ultra wealthy and powerful, and really identified an ‘alternative universe’, as one commentator described it, that the rest of us are largely unaware of. The programme showed how, in Australia, unidentified foreign investors are driving the price of homes beyond the reach of ordinary citizens who live here. There have been other programmes about corruption in the food industry in Europe, which goes beyond the borders of Europe.

 

I’ve read other stories in newspapers, and what they all have in common is inequality. Curiously, Philosophy Now (Issue 145 Aug/Sep 2021) had as its theme, existentialism, but included an article called The Stoic’s Lacuna by Alex Richardson, a History teacher at Croydon, UK. Its relevance to this topic was a reference to the Greek stoic, Epictetus, who said, “Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life.” In other words, accept one’s lot in life and stop whinging.

 

Richardson’s essay extends into the modern day by referencing Katherine Birbalsingh (given the sobriquet, Britain’s strictest headmistress), Dr Michael Sugrue and Jordan Peterson as ‘modern day stoics’, who all advocate in varying degrees, that inequality is the natural order of things. Birbalsingh may be the most liberal of them, when she says, “Of course the world is run by an old boys’ network, and of course it’s not fair.” I admit I know nothing about her outside Richardson’s essay, but he puts her in the same sentence, therefore category, as former Navy SEAL, Jocko Willink, who effectively argues that a person’s day-to-day struggle with paying off a mortgage and generally making ends meet is completely disconnected from ‘political management of the economy’. 

 

Peterson is someone I’m more familiar with, who effectively argues that inequality is an evolutionary consequence of the survival of the fittest, not only in the natural world but in human affairs. People, especially males, get to the top of the heap, where they are especially attractive to females, who copulate and subsequently procreate with them to ensure the survival of both parties’ genes. As it happens, this exact scenario is played out by one of the families represented in the aforementioned TV show, Capital.

 

Richardson believes that Peterson is a ‘follower’ of the ‘Pareto Principle’, expressed in the Bible (both Mark and Matthew): “For to everyone who has will more be given, and he will have abundance, but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.” In other words, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Or as Richardson puts it, “wealth and power naturally accumulate in the hands of a few exceptional individuals at the top” (my emphasis).

 

But, according to Richardson, Dr Michael Sugrue is the most blunt and dispassionate, when he said in a popular lecture on Aurelius that ‘Stoicism teaches us that the social structure is “not our problem” and that, “if God, or nature, or whatever is controlling the world makes you a slave then be a good slave.”'

 

The common thread in all these admonitions, is that they are made by people who see themselves among the privileged elite, who would never contemplate that what they advocate for others could befall them.

 

I think inequality drives injustice, corruption and an upside down economy. To give an example, Italy. It’s well known that there is both social and wealth disparity between the north of Italy, which is the capital of supercars and high fashion, and the south of Italy, which is the home of agriculture and the country’s food bowl. But this dichotomy is worldwide. The production of food, which is essential, is one of the lowest paid occupations in the world.

 

Now, let’s add another factor, called climate change. I don’t find it altogether anomalous that climate change has a dichotomous effect on humanity. It’s the consequence of all the ‘progress’ we’ve made since the industrial revolution, and it’s a juggernaut that can’t be stopped. Yet it will affect the poorer nations first. As the Prime Minister of Samoa, Fiame Naomi Mata’afa, recently said, ‘Pacific Islanders don’t want to be the canary in the coalmine for climate change’. If one looks at Italy again, one could argue that supercars have contributed to climate change and the agriculture sector will bear the consequences.

 

I recently did an online course provided by New Scientist, called Greener Living, which was ostensibly about climate change, its causes and its effects on future generations. According to the people running the course, it will require enormous changes to the way we live, including what we eat.

 

In the 25-26 September issue of the Weekend Australian Magazine (a Murdoch publication, btw) there was an interview with 33 year old Anika Molesworth, a scientist who also runs a farm near Broken Hill in NSW. She says that modelling for 2050 (based on nothing changing) would see 30% decrease in rainfall and 2 months of days above 40C, which would make the property effectively inoperable. But she also claims we have the means at our disposal to change this outcome, and she’s a founding director of Farmers for Climate Action. She’s frustrated by the missed opportunities in our country for renewable energy; we have a government that is stubbornly resistant to changes to the status quo.

 

I made an allusion before to the well known meme of evolution as the survival of the fittest, but much of evolution has occurred through symbiosis. Your body is an entire ecosystem to organisms that thrive in order for you to live, largely without your cognisance. I know from a working lifetime in engineering that successful projects are the result of people collaborating and working together. Environments, including our political environments, where people are antagonistic and work against each other, achieve little except blame and finger-pointing. A perfect example of that is the current political climate in America.

 

If we don’t want to self-destruct, we need to work together, punish corruption that erodes the wealth and agency of ordinary people, adopt sustainable economic models, not dependent on infinite consumerism and keeping people in debt for their entire productive lives. If we stick to the mantra that inequality is the ‘natural order’, we will fail and it will ultimately be catastrophic, worse than the Roman Empire, the Egyptian empire or the Mayan empire, because it will be global.

Tips on writing sex scenes

 Yes, this is a bit tongue-in-cheek, or tongue in someone else’s cheek to borrow a well-worn witticism. This arose from reading an interview by Benjamin Law (Aussie writer) of Pulitzer-prize winning author, Viet Thanh Nguyen, who briefly discussed writing sex scenes. He gives this advice: 

Not being utterly male-centred, if you happen to be a man or masculine. Not being too vulgar. Don’t be too florid. And humour always helps.

 

Many years ago (over a decade) I attended a writers’ convention, where there are always a lot of panel discussions, and there was one on ‘How to write sex scenes’, which was appropriately entertaining and unsurprisingly well attended.

 

Even longer ago, when I attempted to write my first novel, with utterly no experience or tuition, just blindly diving in the deep end, there was the possibility of a sex scene and I chickened out. The entire opus was terrible, but over about 3 years and 3 drafts I taught myself to write. I sent it to a scrip-assessor, who was honest and unflattering. But one of the things I remember is that she criticised me for avoiding the sex scene. I was determined to fix that in subsequent attempts. I still have a hard copy of that manuscript, by the way, to remind myself of how badly I can write.

 

But there are a couple of things I remember from that particular panel discussion (including a husband and wife team on the panel). Someone asked for a definition of pornography, and someone answered: the difference between erotica and pornography is that one you don’t admit to reading (or watching, as is more often the case). So, it’s totally subjective.

 

The first editor (a woman) of ELVENE, took offense at the first sex scene. I promptly sent the manuscript to 2 women friends for second and third opinions. Anyway, I think that you’ll invariably offend someone, and the only sure way to avoid that is to have all the sex happen off the page. Some writers do that, and sometimes I do it myself. Why? I think it depends on where it sits in the story, and is it really necessary to describe every sexual encounter between 2 characters, who start doing it regularly?

 

The other thing I remember from that panel is someone explaining how important it was to describe it from one of the character’s points of view. If you describe it from the POV of a ‘third party’, you risk throwing the reader out of the story. I contend that the entire story should be told from a character’s POV, though you can change characters, even within the same scene. The obvious analogy is with dialogue. You rarely change POV in dialogue, though it’s not a hard and fast rule. In other words, the reader’s perspective invariably involves speaking and listening from just one POV, as if they were in the conversation. The POV could be male or female - it’s irrelevant - but it’s usually the protagonist. I take the same approach to sex scenes. It’s risky for a man to take a woman’s POV in a sex scene, but I’ve done it many times. 

 

I often take the POV of the ‘active’ partner, and the reader learns what the other partner is experiencing second-hand so to speak. It generally means that the orgasm is described from the other partner’s perspective which makes it a lot easier. If they come in unison, I make sure the other one comes fractionally first.

 

I don’t write overlong sex scenes, because they become boring. Mine are generally a page long, including all the carryon that happens beforehand, which is not intentional, just happenstance. I wrote a review of Cory Doctorow’s sci-fi novel, Walkaway, a novel (full title) which has a number of heavy sex scenes which I did find boring, but that probably says more about me than the author. I’m sure there are readers who find my sex scenes ‘heavy’ and possibly boring as well. 

 

I have some rules of my own. They are an interlude yet they should always serve the story. They tell us something about the characters and they invariably have consequences, which are often positive, but not necessarily so. There is always a psychological component and my approach is that you can’t separate the psychological from the physical. They change the character and they change the dynamic of a relationship. Some of my characters appear celibate, but you find them in real life too.

 

I take the approach that fiction is a combination of fantasy and reality and the mixture varies from genre to genre and even author to author. So, in this context, the physical is fantasy and the psychological is reality.

 

One should never say ‘never’, but I couldn’t imagine writing a rape scene or someone being tortured, though I’ve seen such scenes on Scan-noir TV. However, I’ve written scenes involving sexual exploitation, to both men and women, and, in those cases, they were central to the story.

 

Lastly, I often have to tell people that I’m not in the story. I don’t describe my personal sex-life, and I expect that goes for other writers too. 

There are 2 paradoxes in relativity

 This post is based on an interaction I had on Quora. When people discuss the twin paradox (like I did), they always discuss the difference in time, each twin experiences relative to the other; they don’t discuss the difference in distance they experience, which is a logical consequence of the same Lorenz transformation. 

However, someone on Quora conjectured that in reality, the clocks actually measure time at the exact same rate and it’s the distance that changes. Mathematically, there is nothing wrong with this argument, so why do I disagree with it?

 

The twin paradox, of course, is a thought experiment, but there is a real-life experiment where this happens, which I’ve also discussed in another post, and that is the half-life of muons in the Earth’s atmosphere. According to the scientists observing them on the Earth’s surface, there are too many of them, which means they took longer to decay (the half-life got longer). But, from the muon’s perspective, their half-life hasn’t changed, it’s just the distance to the Earth was shorter. Now, this creates a paradox, which is equally manifest in the twin paradox thought experiment. 

 

How can the distance change depending on whose perspective you take? I don’t believe it does. I contend that the moving observer ‘measures’ a shorter distance based on their clock slowing down. But, you’ll say, the whole point of relativity is that no one knows who is moving and who is stationary. Well, there is a reference point, which, in the case of the muons, is the gravitational field of Earth. A body in free fall experiences maximum ‘proper’ time and any deviation from that causes a clock to slow down. The fact is, because the muons are travelling at high fractional light speeds, their deviation from maximum proper time is greater than the observers on the ground. I believe this logic also applies to the travelling twin in the thought experiment.

 

If you take this to extremis, someone could hypothetically travel across the entire galaxy in their lifetime if they travelled fast enough (without exceeding the speed of light). From their perspective, the distance would shrink astronomically, but if they returned to Earth, eons would have passed in their absence. I should point out that science fiction writers (like myself) routinely ignore this fundamental consequence of relativity. We ‘imagine’ that humanity has discovered ‘new physics’ to overcome this ‘problem’

 

I’m not sure how heretical it is to argue this: that time changes but the distance doesn’t. if one goes back to the argument that started this rumination: when the twins reunite their respective clocks disagree and the space-faring twin is noticeably younger than their counterpart. However, they not only disagree on the elapsed time, since the space-faring twin’s departure, they also disagree on how far that particular twin travelled. BUT, now that the space-faring twin is back in the same frame of reference as their Earthbound twin, they concur on the distance, yet still disagree on the time elapsed, evidenced by their clocks and age difference.

 

 

Addendum: Ian Miller (PhD in Chemistry and a self-described 'theoretician' on Quora) argues that it's the ruler that changes relativistically and not the distance travelled. And I'd contend that the clock is effectively the ruler.

Existentialism in everyday life

This is a post I wrote on Quora, in answer to the question:

 

If I believe that life is completely meaningless, am I an existentialist or a nihilist?

 

My answer was ‘upvoted’ by Frederick Dolan, who is Professor at UC Berkeley, after I commented on his own answer to the same question.

 

 

Existentialism is often associated with the absurd, thanks to Camus mostly, which is a short step from nihilism in many people’s minds. There is a view among the scientific community that the Universe is meaningless and that the presence of sentient beings is just a freak accident. Paul Davies refers to this view as the ‘absurd universe’, and I tend to agree with him. 

 

The point is that we find meaning in living our lives through relationships and projects, and even through career or vocation. Viktor Frankl elaborated on this in his book, Man’s Search for Meaning, and added a third way, which is through dealing with adversity. This last ‘way’ might appear ‘absurd’ at first glance, but it’s the premise of virtually every story ever told; it’s a universal theme.

 

Sartre argued that we create our own ‘project’ just by living our lives, and this is what existentialism means to me. So I would contend that there is a direct connection between existentialism and the importance of finding meaning in our lives. In fact, having a ‘purpose’ is considered essential to mental health, according to psychologists. If the Universe has any meaning at all, it’s because it created sentient beings who find meaning against the odds that science tells us are astronomical, both literally and figuratively. Existentialism is about finding purpose in an absurd universe, which is the opposite of nihilism.

A philosophical exploration of Type A and Type B time

 This arose from a question referred to me on Quora. As part of my discussion, I wondered into philosophical territory originally posited over a century ago by a forgotten philosopher, J.M.E. McTaggart, thanks to A.C. Grayling (English philosophers seem to have a predilection for using initials). It seems to fit seamlessly into my own particular philosophy on the relationship between time and consciousness.

 

The original question on Quora, asked by Adriana Moraes (from Sao Paulo, Brazil):

 

How does the past, present, and future exist simultaneously?

 

I don’t believe they do. In fact, I contend that past, present and future are only meaningful concepts in some creature’s mind; which means that I don’t believe it’s a cognitive state unique to humanity.

 

We are only aware of the past because we have memories. In fact, without memory, you wouldn’t know you are conscious. Consciousness exists in a constant present, so time for us is always ‘now’. This, of course, applies to all sentient creatures. For all events that we witness or observe, ‘now’ is ephemeral – they become the past as soon as they happen - which is demonstrated every time someone takes a photo. We say it ‘freezes time’, when in fact, it records an event that would otherwise vanish.

 

Past, present and future require a reference point, and consciousness provides that reference point. We imagine futures, and curiously, the same part of the brain that imagines what might happen, conjures up memories of what has happened. This makes sense when one realises that we attempt to predict the future based on what we have experienced in the past. 

 

Raymond Tallis, who has a background in neuroscience and writes books as well as a regular column in Philosophy Now, makes the observation that our ability to ‘imagine’ future ‘possibilities’, and select one to make ‘actual’, is the very definition of free will, only he calls it 'agency'.

 

In 1908, an Oxford philosopher, J.M.E. McTaggart published a paper titled, On the Unreality of Time in the journal, Mind (ref: A.C. Grayling, The History of Philosophy, 2019). McTaggart argued that there are 2 types of time: Type A, which is based on using the ‘present’ as a reference point for ‘past-present-future’; and Type B, which is just the ordering of events into ‘earlier than/later than’. He contended, in effect, that because ‘now’ is constantly changing, you get contradictions with Type A and Type B (which is perceivably 'fixed'). I’ve over-simplified his argument for brevity, and given it my own interpretation, which is that you can’t have both Type A and Type B. However, I contend that Type B time is just Type A time without consciousness, which resolves that particular paradox.

 

Most physicists, if not all, believe that the past, present and future are all fixed, because, according to Einstein’s special theory of relativity, ‘now’ is totally subjective. This is the so-called ‘block universe’, which is a logical consequence of treating time as a spatial dimension, giving us space-time.

 

You can observe time as a dimension by looking at the night sky and seeing stars hundreds, if not thousands of years, in the past. This means that hypothetical observers in different parts of the Universe see a different ‘now’ and will observe events occurring in different sequences. This is a logical consequence of the finite speed of light. However, causally related events must happen in an objective sequence, irrespective of observers. This is Type B time, as defined by McTaggart. We are able to deduce causality of events that have happened in our past, which gives us theories of cosmology and evolution. This has to be compatible with Type A time, which is dependent on the fact that we all live in the present all of the time. 

 

Whether our present is different to someone else’s present (somewhere else in the Universe) just means that their Type A experience of time is different to ours, but Type B time occurs regardless of conscious observers.

Does QM and classical physics create the irreversibility of time?

 At long last I’ve found a YouTube video that pretty much describes quantum mechanics (QM) as I would. In particular, the narrator (Arvin Ash) expresses the possibility that the transition from QM to classical physics provides the irreversibility of time that we all experience in everyday life. In other words, QM describes the future and classical physics describes the past. The narrator cites Lee Smolin, who actually says that QM describes the ‘present’ and classical physics describes the past. Now, I’ve read Lee Smolin’s book, The Trouble with Physics, and, from memory, he made no mention of this, so maybe this is a new idea from him (I don’t know).

My knowledge of QM is rudimentary at best, so I’m hardly one who can judge, but I’ve been thinking this way since I wrote a post called What is now? in 2015. Back then, I didn’t know that Freeman Dyson had similar ideas. A contributor to Quora, Mark John Fernee, who clearly knows a lot more than me, made a similar point about QM to classical physics being irreversible in time, and whom I quoted in a not-so-recent post.

 

Ash also explains entanglement and decoherence without getting too esoteric about it, and seems to promote the view that entanglement, in principle, could involve the whole universe. Decoherence is often explained as the ‘leaking’ of information. The important point is that decoherence (or the wavefunction collapse) comes from the quantum phenomenon interacting with other particles, that one assumes already exist.

 

The narrator conjectures at the end that the multiverse interpretation is still possible, but I’m not so sure. The whole point of MWI (multiple worlds interpretation) is supposedly that decoherence never happens, but this variation means that it still would happen, only in other universes. Sabine Hossenfelder makes a similar point in a YouTube video of her own. 

 

The other problem with MWI, as I see it, is that entanglement would necessarily incorporate a multiverse. I suspect adherents to MWI (and there are a lot of them) wouldn’t have a problem with that, but I don’t really know. Some highly respected physicists, like Sean Carroll, are advocates of MWI. I really admire Sean Carroll and he readily admits that MWI is one of his personal prejudices. I recently saw a talk he gave on ‘time’ for New Scientist, but he didn’t mention any of this. Instead, he talked about the role of entropy, including its ramifications for the evolvement of the entire universe. I’m a heretic on entropy in that I think it’s a consequence of the arrow of time, not its cause. Having said that, the low entropy state of the Universe in the beginning is still a conundrum, though gravity plays a role in increasing complexity in the Universe, in spite of entropy.

 

In another video (by Closer to Truth), Lee Smolin articulates the possibility that time and 

space may be separate after all, which I’m beginning to wonder myself. Besides, if the Universe has a boundary (or edge) in time, but not in space, that would infer that they are separate. We know that time on a cosmic scale is finite, because we can estimate the age of the Universe.

 

I believe we all live on the edge of time (all of the time), which is contentious. All physicists, that I read and listen to, argue that there is no universal now, and I’m told that to think otherwise is naive, 19^th Century thinking. They argue that Einstein’s theories of relativity rule it out, because clocks run at different rates depending on where they are in the Universe and how fast they are travelling relative to other observers. Actually, it’s dependent on how fast they are travelling relative to an observer following a geodesic in a gravitational field (in free fall or in orbit).

 

I’m well aware that different observers, in different parts of the Universe, see a different ‘now’, because they all see stars 100s or 1000s of light years from them, which means they see them at different ages. And, of course, some of those observers could hypothetically see some of the same stars at different ages, which means they all see a different ‘now’. And then, if they are in motion with respect to each other, that distorts the differences even further. For example, if you have 2 super novae occurring in the field of view of 2 spatially separated observers, they may well see them happening in opposite sequences. Notice that this is true even without relativistic effects.

 

So one shouldn’t be surprised if Einstein’s special theory of relativity tells us that simultaneity appears subjective, both in space and time, because it can be, even without relative motion. But obviously, this isn’t the case where causality is involved. Causality insists on a sequence in time by definition, and it has to be objective, irrespective of what observers see.

 

I like to look at the famous twin paradox, because I think it contains almost everything we need to know about the special theory of relativity. I know it’s a thought experiment, but real experiments done with atomic clocks and aeroplanes and satellites tell us it’s true. The important point is the end result – when the spacefaring twin returns, they are younger than their Earthbound twin. The same effect could be made by the twin travelling near the event horizon of a black hole, which was the premise for Chris Nolan’s movie, Interstellar (which had Kip Thorne as a consultant).

 

But here’s the thing: both twins agree on what time it is in the 4-dimensional spacetime of the Universe. So, 2 observers travelling along different paths can measure different durations of time by whatever means they have, but when they reunite, they agree on where they are in time, in the same way they agree on where they are in space. I can’t see how this is possible if there isn’t a universal ‘clock’, which is arguably the edge of time for the whole universe.

Addendum 1: Mark John Fernee, whom I reference in the main text, and has a PhD in physics, proposes a similar, if not better, argument than I do. He also gives the same explanation of entropy as an 'emergent' property through probabilities that I do in other posts. However, I expect he may not agree with me that there is a 'universal now'. This is his answer to, How did entropy become associated with time?

 

 Addendum 2: Another post by Mark John Fernee (8Aug22) gives an excellent synoptic description of the relationship between classical physics and QM, which reflects my own point-of-view.

Hannah Arendt

 I watched a movie titled, Hannah Arendt (made in 2012), which was a joint European, Israel production, and is classified as ‘biography’ on SBS (where I saw it). It’s a dramatised biography, though it contains archival footage of Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Israel. The story centres on her coverage of the trial for The New Yorker and the controversy that followed. But there are also flashbacks to a younger Hannah, when she was Martin Heidegger’s favourite student and subsequent lover.

It so happens, Philosophy Now (Issue 143, April/May 2021) also had a reasonably in-depth article on her (pp. 50-3) by Hilarius Bogbinder, a Danish born writer and translator, who studied politics and theology at Oxford and now lives in London (according to a footnote).  I re-read the article after seeing the film, and they cover much the same territory.

 

In the movie, she’s portrayed by Barbara Sukowa (who appears equally fluent in German and English) as a feisty woman, capable of holding her own with any intellectual or authority figure. Given she spent time in German occupied France helping Jews escape, before escaping to America herself, one could imagine that she would not be easily intimidated or bullied. Bogbinder describes the young Hannah:

 

Bright and precocious, Hannah [originally Johanna, but always called Hanna] was a bit of a handful. A chain-smoking, self-confident young woman, in the 1920s, she stood out from the mostly male crowd at the University of Marburg.

 

In the movie, she has a sharp mind and a sharper tongue if pushed into a corner, which happened more than once, by various forces, following her coverage of Eichmann’s trial: including Mossad, Princeton University department heads, a particularly vicious journalist from The New York Times, American Rabbis and a large proportion of the New York Jewish community. However, her students loved her.

 

According to Bogbinder, she said in a TV interview in 1964, “I am sorry, but I have to object. I don’t belong to the circle of philosophers. My profession, if you can call it that, is that of political theory.” Yet she was the first woman to teach philosophy at Princeton University. The impression one gets in the movie is that she cared very much about thinking and what I’d call ‘authentic thinking’. To me, philosophy is about argument going back to Socrates and Plato (she references that lineage at one critical point in the movie) as a bulwark against dogma and political ideology. I’ve never read any of her works, but apparently one of her most influential works was The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) where she wrote:

 

While people in all great revolutions fight for true representation, the mob will always shout for the ‘strong man’, the ‘great leader’. For the mob hates society from which it is excluded... Plebiscites, therefore, with which modern mob leaders have obtained such excellent results, are an old concept of politicians who rely upon the mob.

 

Amazingly prescient, if one looks at recent American politics. Bogbinder makes the following observation: “Yet it is not difficult to see how many of her acute observations transcend her times, and apply to the 2020s, when demagogues denounce ‘experts’ and the ‘elites’.” This is also particularly relevant to modern-day Australian politics (for the past decade at least).

 

In this context, one can see why she might have seen herself as a ‘political theorist’, as opposed to ‘belonging to a circle of philosophers’. In one dramatic scene (in the movie), in response to a jibe from a fellow professor in a classroom full of students, she says, ‘That’s not an argument; that’s character assassination’. Maybe the experience at Princeton, following her treatment by her colleagues, made her denounce philosophy as a discipline. She also severed intellectual links with Heidegger after he became a Nazi, which would have disillusioned her.

 

A.C. Grayling, in his ambitiously titled tome, The History of Philosophy, gives her one paragraph, where he says:

 

She is an exemplar of intellect that is both penetrating and courageous. Her chief concern was to argue for the importance of political engagement as a civic responsibility, in order to defeat totalitarianism.

 

According to Grayling, she forgave Heidegger after the war. I won’t try to get into her head on that issue, after all they were once intimate.

 

Even people who have never studied philosophy or who are only vaguely aware of the horrors of the holocaust, know the name of Hannah Arendt because of the term, ‘The Banality of Evil’, which was the subtitle of her book on Eichmann, a publication of the reportage she had submitted to The New Yorker in serial form. The movie provides context for this famous utterance, especially when archival footage shows us firsthand what Eichmann said in his defence. In effect, he was a bureaucrat who was following orders, and ‘obeying the law’ of his government. Hannah Arendt’s most damning indictment against Eichmann was that he didn’t think, in fact, refused to think. The point is that she refused to paint him as a demonic monster because he wasn’t: he was an ordinary person; in effect, a ‘non-person’.

 

But, not only was she accused of ‘defending Eichmann’, which is ridiculous, but of being a ‘self-hating Jewess’, because she reported that some Jewish leaders had been complicit in the transport of Jews. When questioned on this, she simply said that it came out in the trial, so she was obliged to report it. Many in the Jewish community never forgave her for this, and her works didn’t appear in Israel until 1999, when her report, Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), was finally published in that language.

 

Very early in the history of this blog, I wrote a post titled Evil, in response to a book written by TIME Magazine essayist, Lance Morrow. What struck me was that Morrow seemed to believe that evil required a specific personality type. I’ve never believed this. History, including recent history, is full of stories of ordinary people turning against their ‘neighbours’ based on an ingroup-outgroup dynamic. We think that people who commit atrocities in these circumstances are the exception, but the exception is the person who refuses, and in fact, saves people who have been demonised.

I think the one thing we can take from Hannah Arendt’s insight - remember she witnessed this firsthand, and was one of the ones who helped – is that evil happens when people do nothing.

 

There is relevance here to the current situation in Australia where we’ve had people in offshore detention for up to 8 years. This is inhumane, to say the least, and most of us do absolutely nothing.

The dialectic between science and philosophy

 This is a consequence of a question I answered on Quora. It was upvoted by the person who requested it, which is very rare for me (might have happened once before).

Naturally, I invoke one of my favourite metaphors. Contrary to what some scientists claim (Stephen Hawking comes to mind) philosophy is not dead, and in fact science and philosophy have a healthy relationship.

 

The original question was:

 

I see a distinction between "Philosophy" which attempts to describe and explain the world and "Science" in which theories can be proven or disproven. Under this paradigm, what areas claiming to be Science are actually Philosophy? (Requested by Michael Wayne Box.)

 

There are, in fact, 98 answers to this question, many by academics, which makes my answer seem pretty pedestrian. But that’s okay; from what I've read, I took a different approach. I’m interested in how science and philosophy interact (particularly epistemology) rather than how they are distinct, though I address that as well. My answer below:

 

 

Science as we know it today is effectively a product of Western philosophy going all the way back to Plato’s Academy and even earlier. In fact, science was better known as ‘natural philosophy’ for much of that time.

 

Science and epistemology have a close relationship, and I would argue that it is a dialectical relationship. John Wheeler provides a metaphor that I find particularly appealing:

 

We live on an island of knowledge in a sea of ignorance. As the island of knowledge expands, so does the shoreline of our ignorance.

 

I came up with this metaphor myself, independently of Wheeler, and I always saw the island of knowledge as science and the shoreline as philosophy. Seen in this light, I contend that science and philosophy have a dialectical relationship. But there is another way of looking at it, and I’d like to quote Russell:

 

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its question, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe, which philosophy contemplates, the mind is also rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.’ (My emphasis)

 

And this, I believe, touches on the main distinction between science and philosophy: that philosophy asks questions for which we currently don’t have answers and science actually provides answers, even if they’re provisional. And that’s why I argue there is a dialectic, because, as soon as science gives us an answer, it also gives us new questions.

 

To provide examples: Do we live in a multiverse? Will AI become sentient? Was there something before the Big Bang? What is dark matter? How did DNA evolve? All these questions are on the shoreline of our island of knowledge. They are at the boundary between philosophy and science. But that boundary changes as per Wheeler’s metaphor.

 

 

 

That’s what I wrote on Quora, but I can’t leave this subject without talking about the role of mathematics. Curiously, mathematics is also linked to philosophy via Plato and his predecessors. So I will add a comment I wrote on someone else’s post. It might be hubris on my part, but 20^th Century’s preoccupation with language defining our epistemology seems to miss the point, because the Universe speaks to us in its own language, which is mathematical. 

 

With that in mind, this is what I wrote in response to a post that concluded, Philosophy will continue as it has for the past two and a half thousand years, but we presently stand over the wreckage of a philosophical tradition four centuries in the making.

 

 

 

I believe philosophy is alive and well; it’s just had a change of clothes. You can’t divorce philosophy from science, with which it has a dialectical relationship. And that’s just concerning epistemology and ontology.

 

The mistake made in the early 20th Century was to believe mathematics is an artefact created by logic, when in fact, logic is what we use to access mathematics. Godel’s theorem and Turing’s resolution to the halting problem, demonstrate that there will always exist mathematical ‘truths’ that we can’t prove (even if we prove them there will be others). In effect, Godel ‘proved’ (ironically) that there is a difference between ‘truth’ and ‘proof’ in mathematics.

 

But there’s more: Einstein and his cohorts involved in the scientific revolution that took up the whole 20th Century, showed that mathematics lies at the heart of nature. To quote Richard Feynman:

 

Physicists cannot make a conversation in any other language. If you want to learn about nature, to appreciate nature, it is necessary to understand the language that she speaks in. She offers her information only in one form.

 

So we have an epistemological link between the natural world and mathematics. It’s not human language that defines what we call reality, but mathematics. From what I read on this subject, it seems philosophers in general still haven’t caught up with this truth.

Implications of the Mary’s Room thought experiment on AI

 This is a question I answered on Quora, mainly because I wanted to emphasise a point that no one discussed. 

This is a very good YouTube video that explains this thought experiment, its ramifications for consciousness and artificial intelligence, and its relevance to the limits of what we can know. I’m posting it here, because it provides a better description than I can, especially if you’re not familiar with it. It’s probably worth watching before you read the rest of this post (only 5 mins).

All the answers I saw on Quora, say it doesn’t prove anything because it’s a thought experiment, but even if it doesn’t ‘prove’ something, it emphasises an important point, which no one discusses, including the narrator in the video: colour is purely a psychological phenomenon. Colour can only exist in some creature’s mind, and, in fact, different species can see different colours that other species can’t see. You don’t need a thought experiment for this; it’s been demonstrated with animal behaviour experiments. Erwin Schrodinger in his lectures, Mind and Matter (compiled into his book, What is Life?), made the point that you can combine different frequencies of light (mix colours, in effect) to give the sensation of a colour that can also be created with one frequency. He points out that this does not happen with sound, otherwise we would not be able to listen to a symphony.

 

The point is that there are experiences in our minds that we can’t share with anyone else and that includes all conscious experiences (a point made in the video). So you could have an AI that can distinguish colours based on measuring the wavelength of reflected light, but it would never experience colours as we do. I believe this is the essence of the Mary's room thought experiment. If you replaced Mary with a computer that held all the same information about colour and how human brains work, it would never have an experience of colour, even if it could measure it.

 

I think the thought experiment demonstrates the difference between conscious experience and AI. I think the boundary will become harder to distinguish, which I explore in my own fiction, but I believe AI will always be a simulation – it won’t experience consciousness as we do.

Grayling railing against God (I couldn’t help myself)

 I’ve just read A.C. Grayling’s book, The God Argument; The Case against Religion and for Humanism (his emphasis). It’s really a polemic against all deistic religions, even though he claims it’s not a polemic, while acknowledging it probably comes across as one. 

His basic argument, which he iterates in many different ways, is that any belief in God or Gods is irrational, starting with the gods of Norse and Greek mythology and including the Biblical God. It’s a sound argument, because, depending on your culture, you tend to treat one variant as fiction and the other as having personal and spiritual significance. Grayling doesn’t address it in this way: instead, arguing that a belief in God is no different to a belief in Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy; one you grow out of and the other you don’t. The inference is that you are immature or unintelligent or, at best, delusional.

 

I’ve said before that all the Gods I know about have cultural ties and that includes the Abrahamic one. But comparing them to Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy is like comparing them to fictional characters like Superman and Tarzan, or Luke Skywalker. So, what’s the difference? The difference is in the potency that you give them. A God or Goddess is something internal that only has meaning for you. I’ll return to this idea throughout, because I think that God has no meaning outside someone’s mind. 

 

I rejected the biblical God in my teens, after a childhood spent immersed in its teachings. But the decision was more an emotional one than an analytical one. Grayling acknowledges, by the way, that religious belief is emotional, which, for him, is just another reason to dismiss it. I rejected God because I grew to really, really dislike Him. He was the worst type of tyrant: he ruled by fear and terror; he practised genocide on a global scale (the Noahic flood); he sent his ‘children’ to everlasting torment for disobedience; he tortured Job to win a bet with the Devil. Oh, almost forgot: he was going to get Abraham to kill his son, Isaac, to test his loyalty.

 

I once commented that the question: Does God exist? is the wrong question. The real question, which enters the consciousness of any rational person is: What’s the point? Is there a higher purpose to our existence? This is what religions have attempted to address, and in consequence, some have invoked deities.

 

Grayling, in a philosophical sleight of hand, categorises some Eastern philosophies, like

Buddhism and Confucianism as not being religions, because they don’t invoke gods. I think it’s fair to categorise Confucius as a philosopher in the same mould as teachers like Plato and Aristotle. But, like Jesus, both Buddha and Confucius had disciples, and they were all iconoclasts, challenging the social mores of their day, which they believed to be unfair and iniquitous. In fact, I would put Jesus in the same category as Buddha, Confucius and Socrates, who were all persecuted for challenging the status quo.

 

But Grayling conveniently overlooks that the Chinese, who adopted both Buddhism and Confucianism, culturally worshiped their ancestors, which is surely a religious practice. Perhaps Grayling doesn’t know many Chinese, whereas I have lived with Chinese individuals, and they definitely have deities as part of their traditional culture.

 

I’ve argued previously that science is neutral on the existence of God. In other words, science does not rule out a ‘creator’, yet there is obvious conflict between science and religious texts. Science is an epistemology and religion is not – they don’t compare. Some people argue that religion explains what science cannot, but that’s an argument from ignorance. There will always be things we don’t know – I’ve written extensively on that point – but no religious text can provide an explanation to a question that contemporary science can’t answer.

 

I think the notion of an omniscient God has problems with logic. Clifford A Pickover wrote a very thought-provoking book, The Paradox of GOD and the Science of Omniscience. To give examples: even God doesn’t know the last digit of pi, because it doesn’t exist; and God can’t make a prime number non-prime. Some people argue that God created logic and I argue that God is restrained by logic the same as us. The Universe obeys logic not because God created the logic but because logic transcends the Universe.

 

When I say that science does not rule out ‘God’, I mean it doesn’t rule out a ‘purpose’ that may be beyond our kin. We really don’t know. That doesn’t make me agnostic, as I don’t believe in an anthropomorphic creator, but neither does it mean that people who do, are axiomatically irrational, as Grayling contends. I’ve argued before that, in fact, it’s a non sequitur to believe the God you find inside your mind is the creator of the entire universe.

 

The major problem I have with polemical texts against religion is that, whether intentional or not, they promote intolerance. Back in 2010, I quoted Grayling where he seemed to be promoting religious tolerance.

 

And people who didn't have a religious commitment wouldn't mind if other people did privately and they wouldn't attack or criticise them. 

So there was an unwritten agreement that the matter was going to be left quiet. So in a future where the religious organisations and religious individuals had returned to something much more private, much more inward looking, we might have that kind of public domain where people were able to rub along with one another with much less friction than we're seeing at the moment.

 

I believe this is fundamentally the society I live in (in Australia) where, for the most part, people don’t care what you believe, and where religion is not part of our political landscape. In fact, despite having religion as part of my education, I was brought up with the tacit understanding that religious belief was personal and therefore only shared with others under the mutual understanding that it was confidential and deeply private. A secular society is not an atheistic society; it’s a tolerant society or it doesn’t work. 

 

I know people with completely different religious beliefs to me, best friends, in fact. What’s more, in our current society, I’d say political beliefs are far more divisive than religious beliefs. It puts a lie to the argument, proposed by Grayling and other militant atheists, that if we eliminated religion, ‘at its root’, then we would overcome the world’s conflicts. It’s not only simplistic, but naive, even dangerous. Religion does contribute to conflicts but only when it is politicised, which is what we witness in places where religion demarcates territorial disputes or differences in status. Religion is just one marker of ingroup-outgroup discrimination, with race, language and wealth being more likely contenders.

 

Grayling is contemptuous of people who adapt their religious beliefs to their circumstances, arguing that they ‘cherry-pick’ and are ‘hypocrites’. Well, I readily admit that I cherry-pick all the time - just read my blog - but I don’t see that as hypocrisy.

 

Don Cupitt provides a different perspective, which is the opposite point of view:

 

The only ideas, thoughts, convictions that stay with you and give you real support are ones you have formulated yourself and tested out in your own life… In effect, the only religion that can save you is one you have made up for yourself and tested out for yourself: in short, a heresy.

 

Grayling addresses the teleological arguments and the ontological argument and the cosmological argument, all in some detail, which I won’t go into. Paul Davies spent considerable time on them as well in his book, The Mind of God. 

 

But there is one argument that Grayling addressed which I found interesting, and that was Plantinga’s version of the ontological argument based on modal logic. I’ve come across this before, which is based on the premise that if something necessarily exists in a possible world then it must exist in all possible worlds (my emphasis). The problem is with the premise that God must necessarily exist in a possible world. I’ve always thought that this argument is somewhat circular, because it seems to assume that God necessarily exists, which is what it’s trying to prove, via logic alone. Grayling goes into it in some detail and claims that Plantinga eventually gave it up, falling back on an even less credible argument that we know that God exists in the same way we know that the past exists. I may have oversimplified it, but that’s the analogy that Grayling used.

 

The teleological argument comes from Aristotle, as Grayling expounds, because he argued that everything manmade has a ‘final cause’, which is the cause that prompted someone to make it, and you could apply this to the whole universe. I have my own response to this. If humans are the ‘final cause’ of God’s ‘creation’, then, without humans, God has no reason to exist. And this leads me to argue a reverse logic that God is dependent on humans rather than the other way round.

 

This is related to the fine-tuned argument that the Universe is ‘just right’ for complex life to emerge and leads to the anthropic principle. Grayling doesn’t mention the anthropic principle, probably because it tacitly allows teleology back into the picture. Grayling makes an analogy by saying that his antecedents only existed so he could exist, which is a good argument. But the point I like to make is that without conscious entities, the Universe may as well not exist. And we are special in as much as we have the unique ability to comprehend the Universe, as Einstein famously pointed out. Or, as Paul Davies said, ‘we can unravel the plot’. The alternative is what Davies calls the ‘absurd universe’, which appears to be the one Grayling plumps for: we give it a meaning because we are predisposed to providing meanings, but there is no reason to think one should exist. 

 

But this goes to the heart of the debate for me. The whole reason we have religion of any type is because humans wondered if there was something beyond the mortal realm. No one can answer that, but it’s why we created gods in all their manifestations. So gods become a part of a collective consciousness, which is why they can seem real to us. In this context, God is a projection that we laden with all our prejudices and hopes beyond death. One cannot dissociate any notion of God from the human psyche, as Ludwig Feuerbach pointed out in the 19^th Century. God is always in human image, not the other way round. Grayling doesn’t discuss this at all, but I fail to see how one can address God independently of a human context. In effect, we get the God we deserve. And by God, I mean the ideal we imagine we should aspire to. This is why we deify mortal humans like Jesus and Buddha, because they represent an ideal that they could only achieve beyond death.

 

The second half of his book talks about humanism. He spends a chapter on the importance and interdependence of authenticity and truth, and another on human rights. They remind me of my 3 rules for humans. He spends an entire chapter on the ethics of sexual conduct and how it’s been perverted by civilised societies. The book is worth acquiring for that alone.

 

Anyone who reads my blog, knows that I think God is subjective, not objective. Anyone who is a believer, will tell you that God came to them, meaning that God only exists in their mind, not out there. I have no issue with this idea of God; but it’s not what religions tell you. Anyone who has a religious experience is an iconoclast, including Jesus and Buddha. I think the idea that God evolves as a product of our consciousness is far more logical than the idea that He (why he?) created us in his image, as potential companions.

 

I make a distinction between non-theists and atheists. In Australia, there are a lot of non-theists, meaning they don’t care what you believe. Going by this tome (2013), Grayling is ‘anti-theist’, though he claims it’s not a religious belief; it’s the opposite of belief. However, his polemic indicates that he cares about whether someone believes in God or not and, like Dawkins, Harris and others, he proselytises atheism. This is not a non-theistic attitude. Anti-theism may not be a religion, but it’s anti-religious in its rhetoric.

 

I will leave the last word to Einstein, who talks about religion with no mention of God.

 

The most beautiful and deepest experience a man can have is the sense of the mysterious. It is the underlying principle of religion as well as of all serious endeavour in art and science. He who never had this experience seems to me, if not dead, then at least blind. To sense that behind anything that can be experienced there is a something that our minds cannot grasp, whose beauty and sublimely reaches us only indirectly: this is religiousness. In this sense I am religious. To me it suffices to wonder at these secrets and to attempt humbly to grasp with my mind a mere image of the lofty structure of all there is.